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Abstract
This paper considers modelling the performance and reliability of a secure electronic voting scheme.
The scheme provides secure veriﬁable blind voting, however there is a considerable administration
overhead to this level of security. A Markovian process algebra is used to build a performance model
of a basic system of n distributed voters. This model is shown to suﬀer from the familiar state space
explosion problem. A simpler model is therefore developed to allow larger and more practically
relevant systems to be studied. The original model is then extended to include the possibility that
voters may fail and two modes of recovery are considered. The models are evaluated numerically
using data obtained from measuring an implementation of this scheme in order to determine the
accuracy of the approximations.
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1 Introduction
Making electronic voting secure has been an active topic of research for more
than twenty years and many secure electronic voting schemes have been intro-
duced since the inception of anonymous channels to separate voters and votes
by Chaum [2]. Voting scenarios occur in many situations to perform many
tasks in distributed systems, as well as facilitating voting amongst human ac-
tivities. The most publicly visible form of secure voting is the use of online
systems for voting in political elections which has been introduced in several
countries. This form of voting has several obvious requirements.
1
Email: nigel.thomas@ncl.ac.uk
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 128 (2005) 45–58
1571-0661      © 2005 Elsevier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2005.01.012
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
• Only registered voters are allowed to vote.
• Voters only vote once.
• It should not be possible to ﬁnd out who voted, or how they voted.
These factors mean that any voting scheme for use in this scenario has to pro-
vide adequate authentication, vote management and so-called blinding mech-
anisms, whilst operating over a potentially insecure communication medium.
Fujioka et al [6], formalised these requirements as completeness (all votes
counted correctly), soundness (a dishonest voter cannot disrupt the election),
privacy (of votes), unreuseability (cannot vote twice), eligibility (to vote), fair-
ness (of the vote), veriﬁability (of the result). In addition, Iversen [9] in-
troduced the requirement of receipt freeness; many protocols issue receipts
or tokens of some form to prove to the voter that the system behaved as it
should. However, these receipts might be used by a dishonest voter to prove
that they voted in a certain way, thus facilitating vote selling.
Many secure voting schemes rely in some way on encrypting data and
even with fast processors encryption and decryption adds an overhead to data
processing. However, the major overheads arise because of the additional
communication that is required in order to ensure that the requirements of
the secure vote are met. Secure voting schemes will generally use some form of
anonymous channel, digital pseudonyms, blind signatures, trusted authorities
and multiple key ciphers to separate the voter, the authority to vote, the vote
itself and the counting of the vote. Clearly there is a substantial overhead in
providing these measures and therefore the performance of such a system is
of obvious practical interest.
2 A secure electronic voting algorithm
This paper considers a secure electronic voting scheme proposed by Fujoika
et al [6] which has been implemented in at least two systems, SENSUS [5]
and EVOX [7]. The scheme consists of an arbitrary number of voters, an
administrator to issue authority to vote, and a counter to collect votes and to
determine the result. An anonymous channel is used to communicate the vote
between the voter and the collector / counter. The scheme is described thus.
• Preparation: Voter i
(i) Choose the voting strategy.
(ii) Commit to the strategy using a bit commitment scheme ci.
(iii) Blind the committed ballot, bi.
(iv) Sign the blinded ballot svi.
(v) Send to the administrator the signed blinded ballot, the blinded ballot
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and unique voter ID, IDi.
• Administration: Administrator
(i) Receive message from voter i.
(ii) Check right to vote for voter i.
(iii) Check voter i has not voted already.
(iv) Verify the signature; if valid sign the blinded ballot, sai.
(v) Send sai to voter i.
(vi) When the administration period is over, publish a list containing every
{IDj, bj , svj}.
• Voting: Voter i
(i) Unblind sai to give the ballot signed by the Administrator, bai.
(ii) Check signature.
(iii) Send {ci, bai} to the Counter through an anonymous channel.
• Collecting: Counter
(i) Receive message from voter i.
(ii) Check Administrators signature on bai; if valid add {N, ci, bai} to a
list, where N is a unique reference number.
(iii) When the collecting period is over, publish a list containing every
{N, ci, bai}.
• Opening: Voter i
(i) Checks that the vote appears on the list published by the Counter; if
not appeal.
(ii) Send the bit commitment key ki to the Counter through an anonymous
channel.
• Counting: Counter
(i) Use ki to retrieve the voting strategy.
(ii) Check the strategy is valid.
(iii) When all votes are counted, publish the ﬁnal result.
3 Simple PEPA model
A formal presentation of PEPA is given in [8], in this section a brief informal
summary is presented. PEPA, being a Markovian Process Algebra, only sup-
ports actions that are negative exponentially distributed at given rates. Spec-
iﬁcations written in PEPA represent Markov processes and can be mapped to
a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC). Systems are speciﬁed in PEPA in
terms of activities and components. An activity (α, r) is described by the type
of the activity, α, and the rate of the associated negative exponential distri-
bution, r. This rate may be any positive real number, or given as unspeciﬁed
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using the symbol . The syntax for describing components is given as:
P ::= (α, r).P | P + Q | P/L | P 
L
Q | A
The component (α, r).P performs the activity of type α at rate r and then
behaves like P . The component P + Q behaves either like P or like Q, the
resultant behaviour being given by the ﬁrst activity to complete. The com-
ponent P/L behaves exactly like P except that the activities in the set L are
concealed, their type is not visible and instead appears as the unknown type τ .
Concurrent components can be synchronised, P 
L
Q, such that activities in
the cooperation set L involve the participation of both components. In PEPA
the shared activity occurs at the slowest of the rates of the participants and if
a rate is unspeciﬁed in a component, the component is passive with respect to
the activities of that type. The parallel combinator ‖ is used as shorthand to
denote synchronisation with no shared activities, i.e. P‖Q ≡ P 
∅
Q. A
def
= P
gives the constant A the behaviour of the component P .
The algorithm described above is modelled in PEPA as follows.
V oter0
def
= (choose, c1).V oter01 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter01
def
= (bitcommit, b1).V oter02 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter02
def
= (blind, b2).V oter03 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter03
def
= (blind, b3).V oter04 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter04
def
= (sign, s1).V oter05 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter05
def
= (sendA, s2).(sendV,).V oter1 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter1
def
= (unblind, u1).V oter11 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter11
def
= (unblind, u2).V oter12 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter12
def
= (verify, v2).V oter13 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter13
def
= (verify, v3).V oter14 + (publishC,).V oter4
V oter14
def
= (sendC, s6).(publishC,).V oter2
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter2
def
= (check, p ∗ c4).V oter3
+(check, (1− p) ∗ c4).(sendCo, s7).V oter4
V oter3
def
= (appeal, a1).(sendCo, s7).V oter4
V oter4
def
= (new,).V oter0
Administrator
def
= (sendA,).(check, c2).(check2, c3).(verify, v1).
(sign, s3).(sign, s4).(sendV, s5).Administrator
+(publishA, p1).(new,).Administrator
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Collectori
def
= (sendC,).(verify, v4).(verify, v5).(add, a2).
Collectori+1 + (publishA,).(publishC, p2).Counteri
, 0 ≤ i < N
CollectorN
def
= (publishA,).(publishC, p2).CounterN
Counteri
def
= (sendCo,).(check, c5).Counteri−1 , 0 < i ≤ N
Counter0
def
= (finalPublish, f).(new, fast).Collector0
V oters
def
=V oter0 
{publishC,new}
... 
{publishC,new}
V oter0
(
Collector0 
{publishA,new}
Administrator
)
(
sendA,sendV,sendC,
sendCo,publishC,new
) V oters
In essence this is a straightforward client/server process with two servers
and N clients. Each V oter component represents a single client. There are
continuously repeated elections. In each election a voter may vote or not, thus
the collector may receive a number of votes between 0 and N inclusive. The
election period is terminated by the Administrator deciding to publish the
voter list. This in turn causes the Collector to publish the list of votes. A
V oter will then conﬁrm their vote (or appeal ﬁrst if their vote was not on the
list and they voted) with the Counter. The Counter is forced to wait until
every voter who voted has conﬁrmed their vote, before publishing the result
and then calling a new election.
If a voter has not voted it may still have begun the process. Thus in order
to avoid the Collector from being blocked by a V oter the publishC action is
enabled in all of the derivatives of the V oter to force it to abandon voting
when the counting phase begins. Note that publishC is not enabled in the
derivative V oter05.sendA as once the sendA action has been performed, the
Administrator will process the request before publishing the voter list.
3.1 Model analysis and simpliﬁcation
Evaluating this model using the PEPA Workbench [4] the number of states
for a two voter system is found to be 561, for 3 voters 8583 and for 4 voters
130245 states. Four voters was the largest system it was possible to analyse
directly using the PEPA Workbench before running out of memory. The
state space can be dramatically reduced by combining activities internal to
the components. In this way it is possible to consider a model of 7 voters
using the PEPA Workbench (602394 states). However, it is clear that this
is much fewer voters than any practical situation would demand. Hence for
larger values of N it is necessary to take a diﬀerent modelling approach. It
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is also important to note that aggregating sequences of actions changes the
behaviour of the model with respect to higher moments. A number of negative
exponentially distributed actions in series will generally have a lower variance
than a single negative exponentially distributed action with the same overall
mean. However, since the Markovian assumption in this model is in itself an
approximation there is little that can be accurately said about metrics based
on higher moments even in the most detailed model.
Consider the following model speciﬁcation.
V oters0i
def
= (sendA, i ∗ v1).V oters0i−1 + (publishA,).V oters00
, 0 < i ≤ N
V oters00
def
= (new,).V oters0N + (publishA,).V oters00
Administrator
def
= (sendA,).(admin, a).(sendV, s5).Administrator
+(publishA, p1).Administrator
V oters10
def
= (sendV,).V oters11 + (publishC,).V oters4
V oters1i
def
= (sendV,).V oters1i+1 + (publishC,).V oters4
+(sendC, i ∗ v2).V oters1i−1 , 0 < i < N
V oters1N
def
= (publishC,).V oters4 + (sendC,N ∗ v2).V oters1N−1
V oters4
def
= (new,).V oters10
Collectori
def
= (sendC,).(collect, c).Collectori+1
+(publishA,).(publishC, p2).Counteri , 0 ≤ i < N
CollectorN
def
= (publishA,).(publishC, p2).CounterN
Counteri
def
= (sendCo, co).Counteri−1 , 0 < i ≤ N
Counter0
def
= (finalPublish, f).(new, fast).Collector0
(
Collector0 
{publishA}
Administrator
)
(
sendA,sendV,sendC,
publishC,publishA,new
)
(
V oters0N 
{new}
V oters10
)
This model is essentially a modiﬁed closed queueing network, where the nodes
are the waiting voters, the administrator, the voters who have cast their vote,
the collector and the counter.
Figure 1 shows the growth of the state space and the number of transitions
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with the number of voters. Plots are shown for the basic model, the aggre-
gated model (where internal actions have been aggregated) and the queue-based
model.
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Fig. 1. the size of the underlying state space and number of transitions varied with the number of
voters
From this plot it is clear that the basic and aggregated models have poor
scalability and are only suitable for checking the behaviour of the system with
very few voters. As such they can only reliably be used to check for errors
in the scheme and do not give much in the way of practical performance in-
formation. For the two voter case the queue-based model has just 27 states,
a ten voter model has just 399 states. The price paid for that is that a lot
of information has been lost. For the most part this means that multiple se-
quential activities have been replaced by single activities with modiﬁed rates,
potentially introducing greater error for measures based on higher moments.
However, the voter behaviour has also been signiﬁcantly altered. All the vot-
ers are now contained in two components, which are queues of voters who
are waiting to vote or who have voted. There is now no discrimination as to
what the status of an individual voter is. Instead it is only known the number
of voters that have voted. In addition the appeal process has been removed,
which greatly simpliﬁes the behaviour. The delay for checking and possibly
appealing is now incorporated entirely within the counter. This level of infor-
mation is suﬃcient for performance analysis, however it would be insuﬃcient
for verifying the protocol. The combination of the basic model and the queue-
based version allow both forms of analysis for potentially large values of N .
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However, it is important to note that the state space of the queue-based model
grows slightly above linear with respect to the number of voters. Although
the rate of state space increase is much less than the other two models, it is
still such that a 1000 voter system will give rise to a state space of over three
and a half million states.
4 Considering unreliable clients
In the previous models it is assumed that the clients and their messages are
entirely reliable. It is of course possible that a client process may fail, causing
a V oter to be unable to vote, or conﬁrm their vote. In general this failure
may occur at any point in the exchange, thus causing the Administrator,
Collector or Counter to expect a response when none is forthcoming.
Such a failure is modelled as a transition to a failed derivative in the
V oter. In order to allow this fail transition to occur in any derivative, all the
derivatives become preﬁxed (note it is possible to achieve the same eﬀect using
other means, but it quickly becomes diﬃcult to read). The action SendV is
considered to be sent by the Administrator whether or not the V oter can
receive it. Thus, for modelling purposes, it is enabled in V oterFail2. Clearly
this must happen before publishC if sendA has happened, likewise for the
actions new and publishC. If a client is repaired after a new election has been
called, the voter must wait until the next new election before being able to
vote.
Since some voters will have voted and then subsequently failed, they may
be unable to conﬁrm their vote. In order that the Counter does not dead-
lock waiting for this conﬁrmation, a timeout action is introduced. When the
timeout occurs all remaining votes will be discarded. Clearly this may include
some voters who are still active but have not yet conﬁrmed their vote. Thus
this action requires that voters are timely in conﬁrming as well as voting. This
timeout could be modelled as a simple negative exponential transition, how-
ever this obviously gives rise to a highly variable time to count the votes. In
order to reduce the variance an Erlang distributed transition is formed from
a series of negative exponential transitions in the form of a T imer compo-
nent. This means of modelling timeouts in PEPA has been used previously
by Bowman et al [1].
V oter0
def
= (choose, c1).V oter01 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter01
def
= (bitcommit, b1).V oter02 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
N. Thomas / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 128 (2005) 45–5852
V oter02
def
= (blind, b2).V oter03 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter03
def
= (blind, b3).V oter04 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter04
def
= (sign, s1).V oter05 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter05
def
= (sendA, s2).V oter06 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter06
def
= (sendV,).V oter1 + (fail, f).V oterFail2
V oter1
def
= (unblind, u1).V oter11 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter11
def
= (unblind, u2).V oter12 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter12
def
= (verify, v2).V oter13 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter13
def
= (verify, v3).V oter14 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter14
def
= (sendC, s6).V oter15 + (fail, f).V oterFail
+(publishC,).V oter4
V oter15
def
= (publishC,).V oter2 + (fail, f).V oterFail
V oter2
def
= (check, p ∗ c4).V oter3 + (check, (1− p) ∗ c4).V oter21
+(fail, f).V oterFail1
V oter21
def
= (sendCo, s7).V oter4 + (fail, f).V oterFail1
V oter3
def
= (appeal, a1).V oter31 + (fail, f).V oterFail1
V oter31
def
= (sendCo, s7).V oter4 + (fail, f).V oterFail1
V oter4
def
= (new,).V oter0 + (fail, f).V oterFail
V oterFail
def
= (publishC,).V oterFail1
+(repair, r1).(publishC,).V oter4
V oterFail1
def
= (new,).V oterFail + (repair, r1).V oter4
V oterFail2
def
= (sendV,).V oterFail
+(repair, r1).(sendV ).(publishC,).V oter4
Administrator
def
= (sendA,).(check, c2).(check2, c3).(verify, v1).
N. Thomas / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 128 (2005) 45–58 53
(sign, s3).(sign, s4).(sendV, s5).Administrator
+(publishA, p1).(new,).Administrator
Collectori
def
= (sendC).(verify, v4).(verify, v5).(add, a2).Collectori+1
+(publishA,).(publishC, p2).Counteri , 0 ≤ i ≤ N
Counteri
def
= (sendCo,).(check, c5).Counteri−1
+(timeout,).Counter0 , 0 < i ≤ N
Counter0
def
= (finalPublish, f).(new, fast).Collector0
T imer
def
= (PublishC,).(timestep, t1).T imer1
+(new,).T imer
T imeri
def
= (timestep, t1).T imeri+1 + (new,).T imer , 0 < i < X
TimerX
def
= (timeout, t1).T imer + (new,).T imer
V oters
def
=V oter0
j
publishC,
new
ﬀ ... jpublishC,
new
ﬀ V oter0
T imer
(
new,timeout,
PublishC
)
(
Collector0
j
publishA,
new
ﬀ Administrator
)
(
sendA,sendV,sendC,
sendCo,publishC,new
) V oters
This model assumes that if a client fails then it will not be able to play
any further part in the vote, even if the election was still taking place. Thus
an adapted voter has been developed which has a slightly better recovery
mechanism. In order to do this it is necessary to make certain assumptions
about how the clients know what is happening in the election and the nature
of the publishing of voters and votes. It is therefore assumed that on repair a
client must re-initiate a connection. When the connection is re-initiated the
voter process is informed of the current election, its status and any published
lists. The voter can then determine the appropriate behaviour to undertake.
It is assumed that this imposes a delay on the client (part of the repair delay),
but does not aﬀect the server. When modelling this scenario it is necessary to
introduce additional failure states to include the information following repair
which will be available to the voter. This may appear to be rather back-
to-front, but it is the simplest way in which the correct behaviour can be
recovered on repair in this form of model. All the agents up to V oter15 are
as above, the remainder are redeﬁned as follows.
V oter15
def
= (publishC,).V oter2 + (fail, f).V oterFailY es
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V oter2
def
= (check, p ∗ c4).V oter3 + (check, (1− p) ∗ c4).V oter21
+(fail, f).V oterFailY es2
V oter21
def
= (sendCo, s7).V oter4 + (fail, f).V oterFailY es2
V oter3
def
= (appeal, a1).V oter31 + (fail, f).V oterFailY es2
V oter31
def
= (sendCo, s7).V oter4 + (fail, f).V oterFailY es2
V oter4
def
= (new,).V oter + (fail, f).V oterFail1
V oterFail
def
= (publishC,).V oterFail1 + (repair, r1).V oter0
V oterFail1
def
= (new,).V oterFail + (repair, r1).V oter4
V oterFail2
def
= (sendV,).V oterFail + (repair, r1).V oter06
V oterFailY es
def
= (publishC,).V oterFailY es2 + (repair, r1).V oter15
V oterFailY es2
def
= (new,).V oterFail + (repair, r1).V oter2
In this adaptation it is assumed that if a voter has voted and active when
the vote is counted then it will be able to take part in the count, regardless of
how many failures have occurred between voting and counting. Furthermore,
if a voter hasn’t voted, is active and the votes have not been published then
it can vote, again regardless of any failures that have occurred. V oterFail
now represents the behaviour whereby the voter hasn’t voted in the current
election and voting is still active. Repair from this state causes the voter
to return to its initial behaviour. If the voter hasn’t voted and the voting
is over (V oterFail2) then a repairing voter will evolve to V oter4 to await a
new election. The exception to this is if a voter fails and repairs during the
exchange with the administrator; in this case the voter will return to waiting
for the sendV from the Administrator.
5 Numerical results
The models presented above are now evaluated numerically using data derived
from an implementation of the voting scheme. The data is based on using RSA
with a key length of 1024 bits, a maximum bit commitment length of 50 bits,
a random padding of 100 bytes per message and a mix message block size
of 110 bytes. By far the most signiﬁcant time delays in the scheme are the
decryption of the blinded votes and revelation messages. Other signiﬁcant
delays are encountered in the communication involved in sending the various
messages and the overhead in signing the blinded messages. All other actions
are very fast by comparison. Experiments with the implementation showed
that the system is particularly sensitive to the padding length and mix message
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block lengths as these impact the slowest operations.
Figures 2 and 3 show the average number of votes cast in an election varied
against the number of eligible voters where the average duration of an election
is 1000ms. The mean time to choose the vote is 1ms, hence what is being
measured here is the electronic means of submitting and counting the votes.
Figure 2 shows the exact result as calculated from the basic model. Figure 3
shows the absolute percentage error introduced by each of the approximations;
the aggregated model and the queue -based model.
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Fig. 2. The average number of votes cast in an election varied against the number of eligible voters
The errors introduced by the approximations are so small as to be indis-
tinguishable were values for these models plotted in ﬁgure 2. The plot for the
basic model shows a linear growth with the number of voters, i.e. the pro-
portion of successful voters is constant. As expected the error introduced by
the aggregate model is considerably less than that for the queue-based model.
Although both are small for these values of N , both show a growing trend
with N . Hence, whilst this plot indicates the error is acceptable, it cannot yet
be assumed that the error would be acceptable for much larger values of N .
6 Conclusions
In this paper a set of models have been developed and analysed for a secure
voting scheme. One of the major issues encountered has been the size of the
state space of the underlying Markov chains. This means that only a very small
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Fig. 3. The absolute percentage error of the average number of votes cast in an election varied
against the number of eligible voters
number of voters can be considered in a model. Clearly this is not adequate
for practical purposes and an alternative model has been developed to allow
larger and more practically relevant models to be studied. These models have
been evaluated numerically using data captured from an implemented version
of this scheme. The results show an acceptably small degree of error. However,
there is a growth in the error with the number of voters, so it is impossible to
say at this stage whether models of practical numbers of voters can be analysed
accurately in this way. This implies that the basic model must be evaluated
for larger numbers of voters to gain greater conﬁdence in the approximations
introduced. It is possible that tools such as PRISM [10] and ipc [3] will be
able to cope with such models where the PEPA Workbench could not. This
remains an area of continuing investigation.
The parameters for this model are several orders of magnitude diﬀerent
from one another. This means there are considerable problems in gaining and
using accurate results. In this study the consequences of these problems has
not yet been addressed.
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